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I. INTRODUCTION
What choice does a mother have when she must balance an eight-hour workday
with breastfeeding her baby? The answer to this dilemma seems simple at first:
express breast milk by utilizing a breast pump at the workplace. But to complicate
matters, the employee learns that her work schedule will require her to wait five
hours before she can pump. Prior to the commencement of her new job, she
approaches her employer with her concerns. She discovers her employer permits all
employees to take impromptu breaks to use the restroom to tend to bodily functions,
but the employer instructs her to only pump her breasts during her lunch break. She
is banished to an unsanitary restroom stall to pump, and her employer even refuses
her polite request for a chair to sit down. She tries her best to conform to her
employer’s demands, but her breasts refuse to operate on a schedule. They become
painfully engorged, and by lunch her shirt is wet from leaking breast milk. The pain
becomes unbearable so she decides to take an impromptu break to pump, but her
employer terminates her for doing so. Is this a case of sex discrimination?
Recently, the Supreme Court of Ohio seemed poised to answer this question
when it granted certiorari to hear the appeal of Allen v. Totes/Isotoner Corp.1 It had
been widely expected that the court would address this specific issue.
Disappointingly, the splintered court in Totes/Isotoner decided to completely avoid
the question. This result has left Ohio employers and employees unsure about
whether discrimination on the basis of lactation is permissible.
The Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision to affirm the summary judgment in favor
of Totes opened the door for employers to implement facially discriminatory
employment policies that single out lactating women. Because the court did not
decide whether discrimination on the basis of lactation is prohibited by the Ohio Fair
Employment Practices Act2 (FEPA), as amended by the Ohio Pregnancy
1

Allen v. Totes/Isotoner Corp., 915 N.E.2d 622 (Ohio 2009).

2

See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(A) (West 2008). It is unlawful

[f]or any employer, because of the race, color, religion, sex, military status, national
origin, disability, age, or ancestry of any person, to discharge without just cause, to
refuse to hire, or otherwise to discriminate against that person with respect to hire,
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Discrimination Act3 (PDA), Ohio’s appellate districts will likely conflict over this
issue. In the future litigation of a lactation discrimination case, a successful
argument can be made to convince an Ohio court that discrimination on the basis of
lactation is considered pregnancy discrimination under Ohio law since “lactation is
‘because of or on the basis of pregnancy’ and . . . women who are lactating are
women ‘affected by pregnancy [or] childbirth.’”4
Part II of this Note will explain the relevant statutory and case law background
behind pregnancy and lactation discrimination at both the federal and state levels.
Part III.A will explain why the Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision to affirm the
appellate court’s grant of summary judgment was improper. Part III.B will explain
why the Supreme Court of Ohio’s analysis of the accommodation issue is incorrect.
Part IV.A will describe how this improper decision could open the door to facially
discriminatory workplace policies that discriminate against lactating employees.
Part IV.B will explain how this decision will lead to future conflicts among the Ohio
appellate districts. Part IV.C will make a recommendation of how Ohio employers
should treat their lactating employees in light of this recent decision. Part V will
offer guidance on how to successfully litigate a lactation discrimination case in Ohio.
Part V.A will explain why it is important to distinguish breastfeeding from lactation.
Part V.B will provide employment law litigators with a strong argument to convince
an Ohio court that lactation discrimination is included within the scope of a the Ohio
Pregnancy Discrimination statute. Part V.C will explore potential legislative
initiatives that would provide protection to breastfeeding employees who need to
express breast milk at the workplace.
II. BACKGROUND: PREGNANCY AND LACTATION DISCRIMINATION
A. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert5
The U.S. Supreme Court case General Electric Co. v. Gilbert was the first case
to interpret whether pregnancy discrimination could be considered sex
discrimination as defined by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.6 In this case,
the employer provided disability benefit coverage for all disabilities except
disabilities arising due to pregnancy.7 The Court utilized a comparability analysis in
which it compared a class of pregnant employees with a class of non-pregnant
employees.8 The Court noted that the class of pregnant women was comprised
entirely of female employees, while the class containing non-pregnant employees

tenure, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, or any matter directly or
indirectly related to employment.
Id.
3

See id. § 4112.01(B) (West 2009).

4

Totes/Isotoner, 915 N.E.2d at 630 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (alternation in original).

5

Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).

6

Id.

7

Id. at 127.

8

Id. at 134-35.
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was comprised of both male and female employees.9 The Court held that sex
discrimination only occurs when a class of women is disadvantaged in comparison to
a class comprised entirely of men.10
Justice Stevens wrote a dissent for the Gilbert decision.11 Justices Brennan and
Marshall joined the dissenting opinion that argued the proper classifications to
determine whether sex discrimination existed were classes comprised of those at risk
of pregnancy and those who were not at risk of pregnancy.12 The three justices
concluded that because women were the only sex at risk of becoming pregnant, they
were being discriminated against because of their sex.13
B. The Federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 197814
In 1978, two years after the Gilbert decision, Congress amended Title VII with
the passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA).15 This amendment
reversed the Gilbert holding and provided that pregnancy discrimination was a per
se violation of Title VII because pregnancy discrimination is a per se form of sex
discrimination.16 However, several federal courts still apply the logic behind the
Gilbert majority opinion despite the fact that Congress rejected this logic when it
passed the federal PDA.17 An inquiry into the legislative history behind the federal
9

Id. at 135.

10

Id. at 136.

11

Id. at 160-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

12

Id. at 161-62. Justice Brennan pointed out how flawed the majority’s sex-neutral
approach was when he discussed how the plan also covered male-specific procedures such as
circumcisions, prostatectomies, and vasectomies. Id. at 152-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
13

Id. at 161-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that “[b]y definition, [a
benefit policy excluding disabilities arising from pregnancy] discriminates on account of sex;
for it is the capacity to become pregnant which primarily differentiates the female from the
male.” Id.
14
42 U.S.C. 2000e(k) (2006) (amending Title VII’s terms “because of sex” and “on the
basis of sex” to include pregnancy).
15

The amendment provides:

The terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” include, but are not limited to,
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and
women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be
treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits
under fringe benefits programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their
ability or inability to work . . . .
Id.
16

H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 3 (1978).

17

Cases in which federal courts have dismissed claims brought by female employees
based on sex-specific biological differences include: Martinez v. N.B.C. Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d
305, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing the majority opinion in Gilbert to deny a claim for sex
discrimination based on breastfeeding); Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F. Supp. 867, 869
(W.D. Ky. 1990) (citing the majority opinion in Gilbert to deny a claim for sex discrimination
based on breastfeeding). “Failing to recognize and provide remedies for women facing
discrimination perpetuates an unequal work situation, which is a result of courts attempting to

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol59/iss2/6

4

2011]

WEANING OHIO EMPLOYERS OFF OF LACTATION

269

PDA reveals that Congress outrightly disapproved of the logic in Gilbert.18
Although the legislative history and intent behind the federal PDA reveals that
Congress rejected both the reasoning and holding in Gilbert, many federal courts
have ignored this fact by construing the federal PDA with a very narrow
interpretation that the PDA only carved out one exception, pregnancy itself.
C. The Ohio Pregnancy Discrimination Act and Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores19
In 1980, after Congress enacted the federal PDA, Ohio enacted its own version of
the PDA.20 The Ohio General Assembly amended its state Title VII counterpart,
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.02(A), by instituting the Ohio PDA.21 The Sixth
Circuit recently interpreted the legislative intent behind the Ohio PDA:
Having incorporated the [federal] PDA’s language almost verbatim
into the definitional provisions of § 4112, it is clear to us that the Ohio
Legislature was aware of the meaning and rationale of Gilbert, as well as
being aware of the [federal] PDA. The Legislature made a conscious
choice to extend the definition of discrimination to include pregnancy
even though there cannot be a class of similarly situated males.22
The Sixth Circuit concluded that the legislature intended to limit the type of
pregnancy discrimination claims based on sex discrimination to claims of
employment discrimination. The Sixth Circuit took notice of the fact that Ohio
adopted its version of the PDA in 1980, which was three years before the U.S.
Supreme Court explicitly held that the federal PDA overruled the Gilbert decision.23
Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores is an important case because it is the first time
any court considered whether breastfeeding women qualified as a protected class
from discrimination under Ohio law.24 This case dealt with plaintiff mothers who

ignore biological truths in favor of a supposed gender-blind justice and serves only to
perpetuate the status quo.” Maureen E. Eldredge, The Quest for a Lactating Male: Biology,
Gender, and Discrimination, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 875, 882 (2005).
18

“It is the committee’s view that the dissenting Justices correctly interpreted [Title VII in
Gilbert].” H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 2. “[I]t seems only commonsense, that since only women
can become pregnant, discrimination against pregnant people is necessarily discrimination
against women . . . .” 123 CONG. REC. 10581 (1977) (statement of Rep. Hawkins).
19
Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Derungs II), 374 F.3d 428, 430 (6th Cir. 2004)
(holding that Ohio’s Public Accommodation Statute, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(G),
does not prohibit owners of places of public accommodation from restricting breastfeeding in
such places).
20

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(B) (West 2009).

21

Derungs II, 374 F.3d at 436.

22

Id.

23

Id. (citing Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669
(1983)). This fact seems irrelevant given that the legislative history of the federal PDA
clearly evidences that Congress fully intended to overrule the Gilbert decision five years prior
to Newport News. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 95-948.
24
Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Derungs I), 141 F. Supp. 2d 884, 889 (S.D. Ohio
2000), aff’d, 374 F.3d 428 (6th Cir. 2004) (referring to the issue of breastfeeding
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were restricted from breastfeeding at defendant Wal-Mart’s stores in Ohio.25 The
plaintiffs filed a lawsuit claiming Wal-Mart discriminated against them because of
their sex.26 Plaintiffs argued that Ohio’s public accommodation statute (OPAS),27
which prohibits sex discrimination, provided breastfeeding mother with the right to
breastfeed in any place of public accommodation.28 The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart on the sex discrimination claim.29 The
plaintiffs appealed the case to the Sixth Circuit and sought review of the sex
discrimination issue.30
The Sixth Circuit’s first step in its analysis was to look at the Ohio Legislature’s
intent behind its enactment of OPAS.31 The court determined that the Ohio
Legislature intended to limit claims of pregnancy discrimination to employment
discrimination claims.32 The second step in the court’s analysis was the application
of federal employment law by way of a comparability analysis.33 By utilizing the
Gilbert comparability analysis, the court curiously compared how Wal-Mart treated
breastfeeding women with how it treated breastfeeding men and concluded that there
was no sex discrimination because both subclasses were treated in the same
manner.34 The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and
discrimination under Ohio law as a matter of first impression because it has not yet been
decided by a federal or Ohio state court prior to this case).
25

Id. at 885.

26

Id.

27

OPAS provides:

It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice . . . [f]or any proprietor or any
employee, keeper, or manager of a place of public accommodation to deny to any
person, except for reasons applicable alike to all persons regardless of race, color,
religion, sex, military status, national origin, disability, age, or ancestry, the full
enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of the place of
public accommodation.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(G) (West 2008).
28
Derungs II, 374 F.3d at 430. This case was initially filed in state court but was removed
to federal court on diversity of citizenship. Id.
29

Derungs I, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 894.

30

Derungs II, 374 F.3d at 431 n.1 (stating that plaintiffs waived appeal of their tort and
age discrimination claims and were only appealing their sex discrimination claim).
31

Id. at 436 (stating that because the legislature only amended sections (A)-(F) of the
Ohio Civil Rights Act with the Ohio PDA’s definition of pregnancy as sex discrimination, the
legislature did not intend to include the definition of pregnancy discrimination as sex
discrimination in section (G), which pertains to public accommodations).
32

Id.

33

Id. at 435-36 (concluding that since Ohio passed OPAS before the Supreme Court
overruled Gilbert with Newport News, the reasoning of the Gilbert majority could correctly be
applied to the interpretation of OPAS). The court fails to acknowledge that the federal PDA
overruled Gilbert five years prior to the Newport News decision.
34

Id. at 437.
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found that OPAS does not prohibit restrictions on public breastfeeding because its
prohibition does not constitute discrimination based on sex.35
D. Ohio’s Protection of Public Breastfeeding
Many states have exempted public breastfeeding from their criminal indecent
exposure statutes.36 Ohio does not have statutory language to exempt breastfeeding
from its indecent exposure statutes. However, an Ohio Court of Appeals interpreted
Ohio’s indecent exposure statute as though it excluded the criminalization of
exposure of female breasts.37 Following the Derungs decision, the Ohio Legislature
adopted legislation to protect public breastfeeding.38 This legislation partially
overruled the Derungs decision.39 This law went into effect on September 16,
2005.40
E. Allen v. Totes/Isotoner Corp.
1. Facts of the Case
In July 2005, Totes hired LiNisa Allen through Star Personnel, a temporary
service.41 When Allen was initially hired, she was still breastfeeding her five-monthold baby.42 When she was unavailable to breastfeed, she used a breast pump to
express the breast milk from her breasts.43 It took Allen approximately fifteen
minutes to pump, including the time required to unpack and repack her pump.44
Allen needed to pump because “her breasts would enlarge to a point where they
would start leaking all over her shirt,” and if she became engorged she would suffer
from severe back pain.45
35
Id. at 436-37 (concluding that the statutory language and the legislative history of OPAS
do not include breastfeeding discrimination as sex discrimination).
36

See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 245.01 (McKinney 2010) (excluding breastfeeding from
an indecent exposure statute which prohibits public exposure of female breasts).
37

State v. Jetter, 599 N.E.2d 733, 733 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam) (concluding that
the Ohio public indecent exposure statute, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.09, does not consider
female breasts a private part). This effectively exempts public breastfeeding from the Ohio
public indecent expsoure statute.
38
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.55 (West 2005) (“A mother is entitled to breast-feed her
baby in any location of a place of public accommodation wherein the mother otherwise is
permitted.”).
39

Id. This law amends the building standards code rather than amending OPAS or the
Ohio Civil Rights Act.
40

See id.

41

Allen v. Totes/Isotoner Corp. (Totes/Isotoner trial court), No. CV06-03-0917, slip op.
at 2 (Butler Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl. July 31, 2007), aff’d, 915 N.E.2d 622 (Ohio 2009).
42

Id.

43

Id.

44

Id.

45

Id.
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On July 25, 2006, Allen attended an orientation session at the Totes facility prior
to the commencement of her new job.46 At this orientation, Allen was provided with
her work schedule. Her work day lasted from 6:00 a.m. to 2:30 p.m., with two tenminute breaks at 8:00 a.m. and at 1:00 p.m. and a half-hour lunch break at 11:00
a.m.47
Allen approached Angel Gravett at the end of the orientation session to inform
her that she was breastfeeding her baby.48 Allen notified her that she needed a place
to pump her breasts.49 Later in the day, Gravett contacted “Allen by phone and told
her she could pump her breasts in the women’s restroom during her lunch break.”50
Allen told Gravett that she would attempt to wait until 11:00 a.m. to pump her
breasts, but “she didn’t know if she could.”51 Allen requested a chair so she would
have a place to sit, but Totes denied her request.52
After about a week Allen found that she was unable to wait until 11:00 a.m. to
pump.53 Consequently, she began taking one additional break at 10:00 a.m. to
pump.54 On August 16, 2006, Karen Kidder, a supervisor, observed Allen pumping
her breasts in the restroom.55 Soon afterwards, Gravett confronted Allen about
taking an “unauthorized break.”56 Allen told Gravett that “she could not wait until
11:00 a.m. to pump her breasts.”57
Allen asked Kidder to extend her morning break from 10 minutes to 15 minutes
so she would have adequate time to pump her breasts on her break.58 Kidder brought
Allen’s request to Fred James and he “made the decision to terminate Allen for not
following company rules” because she took an unauthorized break.59
2. Procedural History
“On March 16, 2006 [Allen] filed a complaint against Totes alleging three counts
of discrimination: (1) violation of Ohio’s prohibition against gender discrimination,
(2) violation of Ohio public policy, and (3) violation of Ohio’s prohibition against
disability discrimination.”60 Totes moved for summary judgment on all of the
46

Id.

47

Id.

48

Id.

49

Id.

50

Id.

51

Id.

52

Id.

53

Id. at 3.

54

Id.

55

Id.

56

Id.

57

Id.

58

Id.

59

Id.

60

Id.
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claims.61 This Note will focus on Count I of the complaint which alleges sex
discrimination. The Court of Common Pleas in Butler County granted summary
judgment in favor of Totes; Allen appealed.62 The Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court.63 Subsequently, Allen’s appeal was allowed by the Supreme Court of
Ohio.64
The trial court found that Allen failed to assert a prima facie case of pregnancy
discrimination.65 The court stated, “Allen gave birth over five months prior to her
termination from Totes. Pregnant woman [sic] who give birth and chose not to
breastfeed or pump their breasts do not continue to lactate for five months.”66 The
court decided that Allen’s condition of lactation related to breastfeeding, not to
pregnancy.67
It reasoned that breastfeeding discrimination is not gender
discrimination.68
The court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment. However, it held that
Allen “was not terminated because she was lactating, pumping breast milk, or
needed to take a break to pump breast milk.”69 Instead, the court concluded she was
terminated “for taking an unauthorized, extra break (unlike the restroom breaks
which were authorized and available to all of the employees, appellant included).”70
The Supreme Court of Ohio accepted Allen’s appeal in order to review the issue
of whether Ohio law prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee
due to lactation.71 This appeal resulted in a divided court. Justice Lanzinger would
have dismissed the appeal as having been improperly granted.72 In a per curiam
decision the Supreme Court of Ohio held that Totes had articulated a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Allen. She had failed to follow directions
and this was not a pretext for pregnancy discrimination.73 Justice Lundberg Stratton,
Justice O’Donnell, and Justice Cupp concurred in affirming the summary judgment,
however, they decided not to address whether discrimination on the basis of lactation

61

Id. at 3-4.

62

Allen v. Totes/Isotoner Corp. (Totes/Isotoner appellate court), No. CA2007-08-196,
2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 5910, at *1 (Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2008), aff’d, 915 N.E.2d 622 (Ohio
2009).
63

Id. at *4.

64

Allen v. Totes/Isotoner Corp., 915 N.E.2d 622, 623 (Ohio 2009) (per curiam).

65

Totes/Isotoner trial court, slip op. at 6-7.

66

Id. at 7.

67

Id.

68

Id. at 7 (citing Derungs II, 374 F.3d 428, 439 (6th Cir. 2004)).

69

Totes/Isotoner appellate court, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 5910, at *3.

70

Id. (citing Popp v. Integrated Elec. Servs., Inc., No. CA2005-03-058, 2005 Ohio App.
LEXIS 4876 (Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2005)).
71

Totes/Isotoner Corp., 915 N.E.2d at 623.

72

Id. at 624.

73

Id.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2011

9

274

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:265

is prohibited by Ohio law because they felt their opinion would be advisory.74
Justice O’Connor wrote a separate concurring opinion and Chief Justice Moyer
joined. This concurring opinion also affirmed the summary judgment but disagreed
that an opinion would be advisory on the issue of lactation discrimination.75 Justice
O’Connor felt that this issue was not rendered moot by granting summary judgment
to Totes. Instead, she determined that “the issues are live ones, not remote
possibilities or based on controversies that may never occur.”76 She came to the
conclusion that lactation is a condition relating to pregnancy. She stated she would
“hold that gender-discrimination claims arising from lactation are cognizable under
Ohio’s FEPA as amended by the PDA.”77
Justice Pfeifer was the only dissenting justice. He decided that granting
summary judgment to Totes was improper. He was troubled by the fact that the
record did not explain why Allen’s restroom trips made outside of scheduled breaks
were different from the restroom trips other employees made outside of their
scheduled breaks.78 He noted that Allen was the only one fired for taking these
unscheduled restroom breaks and consequently, she should have an opportunity to
prove her claim to a jury. Justice Pfeifer would have held “that employment
discrimination due to lactation is unlawful pursuant to R.C. 4112.01(B).”79
III. ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO’S DECISION
In its per curiam decision, the Supreme Court of Ohio declined to answer
whether discrimination due to lactation constitutes sex discrimination.80 In
particular, the Supreme Court of Ohio failed to determine whether this form of
discrimination is included within the scope of the Ohio FEPA, as amended by the
PDA.81 Chief Justice Moyer, Justice O’Connor, and Justice Pfeifer were in
agreement that “[sex]-discrimination claims arising from lactation are cognizable
under Ohio’s FEPA as amended by the PDA.”82 However, it remains unclear
whether the other four justices agreed or disagreed with this premise. Consequently,
female employees remain unsure about whether they are protected under Ohio law if
they choose to return to work and pump milk in the workplace for their breastfeeding
child.
A. The Supreme Court of Ohio Incorrectly Affirmed the Grant of Summary
Judgment
Under Ohio law, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of employment
discrimination by applying the standard set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
74

Id. at 625 (O’Donnell, J., concurring).

75

Id. at 625-26 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

76

Id. at 627.

77

Id. at 630.

78

Id. at 633 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).

79

Id.

80

Id. at 624 (per curiam).

81

Id.

82

Id. at 630 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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Green.83 Under this standard, the plaintiff must establish: “(1) she is a member of a
protected class; (2) that she suffered an adverse employment action; (3) that she was
qualified for the position; and (4) either that she was replaced by someone outside
the protected class or that a comparable, non-protected person was treated more
favorably.”84 Once a prima facie case is established, “the burden of production shifts
to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its treatment
of the plaintiff.”85 The record in the present case provides a basis from which a jury
could conclude that Totes failed to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for Allen’s termination. Regrettably, the Supreme Court of Ohio agreed with the
appellate court when it cited Allen’s unauthorized breaks from her workstation as a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Allen’s termination.86
Two arguments can be made to support the fact that summary judgment was
improperly granted for Totes. First, there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether
Allen carried out any act of insubordination when she used the restroom to pump her
breasts during an impromptu break. As offensive as it may be, Totes did in fact
classify pumping breast milk as a restroom function.87 This is illustrated by Manager
Angel Garrett’s actions when she responded to Allen’s request for a private place to
pump by telling her to use the restroom.88 If the benefit of the facts is given to Allen,
as the non-moving party, it is apparent she was following the impromptu break
policy permitting “restroom breaks which were authorized and available to all of the
employees”89 when she was observed pumping milk by her supervisor. This creates
a genuine issue of fact as to whether taking “unauthorized breaks” was the true
reason for Allen’s termination, or if it was just a pretext for discrimination against a
lactating employee.
Secondly, assuming Allen did engage in insubordination, her only act of
insubordination in the record was failing to follow an employer’s facially
discriminatory impromptu break policy. In light of this alleged insubordination, her
claim is still sufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment. Gravett directed
Allen to pump her breasts during her 11:00 a.m. lunch break.90 Meanwhile,
impromptu breaks were available to all employees throughout the workday to tend to
83
James v. Delphi Auto. Sys., No. 04AP-215, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4941, at *4 (Ct.
App. Oct. 14, 2004) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).
84

Id.

85

Totes/Isotoner, 915 N.E.2d at 623 (citing Plumbers & Steamfitters Joint Apprenticeship
Comm. v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm’n, 421 N.E.2d 128, 132 (Ohio 1981)).
86

Id. at 624.

87

Many states have explicitly stated in their statutes that a woman who wishes to
breastfeed or pump breast milk must be provided with a private space that is not a bathroom
stall. An example of this statutory language can be found in Vermont under VT. STAT. ANN
tit. 21, § 305 (2008).
88

Totes/Isotoner trial court, No. CV06-03-0917, slip op. at 2 (Butler Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl.
July 31, 2007), aff’d, 915 N.E.2d 622 (Ohio 2009).
89
Totes/Isotoner, 915 N.E.2d at 627 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Totes/Isotoner
appellate court, No. CA2007-08-196, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 5910, at *3 (Ct. App. Apr. 7,
2008)).
90

Totes/Isotoner trial court, slip op. at 2.
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bodily functions.91 Lactation is a bodily function, but the record reflects that Totes
specifically excluded breast pumping from its impromptu break policy and classified
it as an unauthorized break activity.92 This break policy is facially discriminatory
because it singled out lactating women.93 Justice Pfeifer correctly indentified the
problems with singling out Allen’s breaks in his dissenting opinion:
The appellate court does not explain why Allen’s trips to the restroom
outside scheduled break times were different from the restroom trips other
employees made outside scheduled break times. There is no evidence in
the record about any limit on the length of unscheduled restroom breaks
and no evidence that employees had to seek permission from a supervisor
to take an unscheduled restroom break. There is evidence only that
unscheduled bathroom breaks were allowed and that LaNisa Allen was
fired for taking them. What made her breaks different?94
Consequently, Totes cannot meet its burden of production to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its treatment of Allen by stating that she failed to
follow a facially discriminatory break policy.
The Supreme Court of Ohio should have utilized an analysis similar to the
reasoning found in Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC95 to
analyze the present case. In Newport News, the U.S. Supreme Court utilized a
comparability approach to conclude that the medical plan benefits policy was
facially discriminatory because of sex.96 The Court compared two classes: the
husbands of female employees (a class not at risk of pregnancy) with the wives of
male employees (a class at risk of pregnancy).97 Even though all of the employees’

91

Totes/Isotoner, 915 N.E.2d at 627 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Totes/Isotoner
appellate court, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 5910, at *3).
92
See id. Allen was terminated for failure to follow directions after she was observed
pumping breast milk around 10:00 a.m. Totes/Isotoner trial court, slip op. at 3.
93

Justice O’Connor notes that Allen argued the break policy was facially discriminatory:

Allen’s claims of discrimination appear predicated on a disparate-treatment theory.
She asserts, “The workrule that [she] allegedly violated was the one that restricted the
time she could pump her breast milk to her lunch break. Totes placed no such
restrictions on any other employee who needed to leave his or her workstation to tend
to a bodily function or bodily discomfort, only upon lactating women. The work rule
was itself discriminatory, since it placed extra restrictions on women experiencing a
physical act of pregnancy.”
Totes/Isotoner, 915 N.E.2d at 630 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (alteration in original).
94

Id. at 633 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).

95

Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983). This was
the first Supreme Court decision to interpret the federal PDA after it was passed in 1978. The
rationale in this case is relevant to the Ohio PDA because it is adopted of the federal PDA’s
statutory language verbatim.
96

Id. at 683-84.

97

Id. As other authors have noted, Justice Stevens utilized a comparability analysis in the
Gilbert dissenting opinion:
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spouses received the same “specified level of hospitalization coverage for all
conditions; the wives of male employees receive[d] such coverage except for
pregnancy related conditions.”98 This benefit policy is analogous to the impromptu
break policy found in Totes. All employees were afforded the opportunity to utilize
their impromptu breaks for the same authorized bodily functions, such as urination
and defecation. However, employees at risk of lactation (women) were afforded
these breaks to attend to bodily functions except for lactation-related activities such
as expressing milk. According to the record, the employer did not place any
limitations on the type of bodily functions that employees who are not at risk of
lactation (men) were able to take. The employer also did not state that it placed any
time restrictions on the length of time employees could spend on an impromptu
break to tend to their bodily functions.99 Therefore, parallel to the holding in
Newport News,100 this employer policy disadvantages only female employees and is
facially discriminatory because of sex.
Totes was fully aware that Allen was a breastfeeding mother and required a time
and a place to express breast milk at the workplace. Totes designed its impromptu
break policy to exclude pumping breast milk and required Allen to adhere to this
break policy when she was physically incapable of doing so. An employee plaintiff
can establish a prima facie case by presenting direct evidence of discriminatory
intent.101 Totes’ impromptu break policy is a facially discriminatory employment
policy.102 “[A] facially discriminatory employment policy . . . is direct evidence of
discriminatory intent.”103 In a case containing direct evidence of discriminatory
intent, once a plaintiff shows that the prohibited classification was a motivating
factor in the employment decision, the burden of production and persuasion shifts to
the employer. The employer must prove that it would have terminated the employee
even if it had not been motivated by impermissible discrimination.104 Totes did not

A principal argument of the dissenters was that the majority had misstated the
composition of the two relevant classes. Rather than the majority’s conception of
there being a class of pregnant workers and a class of non-pregnant workers, the
dissenters argued that the more accurate characterization was “between persons who
face a risk of pregnancy and those who do not.”
Henry Wyatt Christrup, Note, Litigating a Breastfeeding and Employment Case in the New
Millennium, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 263, 279-80 (2000) (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125, 161 n.5 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
98

Newport News, 462 U.S. at 684 (emphasis added).

99

Totes/Isotoner, 915 N.E.2d at 633 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).

100

The employer policy in Newport News was found to be facially discriminatory because
of sex since it disadvantaged only male employees. Id.
101

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion).

102

See supra note 91 and accompanying text.

103

Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 563 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985); LaPointe v. United Autoworkers Local
600, 8 F.3d 376, 379-80 (6th Cir. 1993)).
104

Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45; Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 29
F.3d 1078, 1081 (6th Cir. 1994).
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meet its burden of production or persuasion to prove that it terminated Allen for a
reason not motivated by impermissible discrimination.105
The courts’ fixation on “extra, unauthorized breaks” may have blinded both the
lower courts and the Supreme Court of Ohio in their analysis. This fixation likely
caused the judges to overlook performing a complete analysis to determine whether
the impromptu break policy was indeed facially discriminatory. It is logical to
believe the judges were motivated to prevent a plaintiff from recovering from an
employer after she admitted to taking a paid fifteen-minute break everyday for two
weeks. However, this form of post hoc analysis is inappropriate and the lower
courts, in addition to the Supreme Court of Ohio, should have performed a suitable
analysis to determine that the impromptu break was facially discriminatory.
B. The Supreme Court of Ohio Got the Sex Discrimination Analysis Wrong on the
Accommodation Issue for Lactating Employees
The Supreme Court of Ohio misinterpreted the lactation accommodation
argument made in Totes/Isotoner. The accommodation issue argued by Allen was
not whether Totes was required to accommodate her lactating condition under the
Ohio PDA by providing her with special additional breaks above and beyond what
other employees were receiving. Instead, Allen argued her need to express breast
milk should have been accommodated by allowing her to spend her impromptu
breaks pumping milk to relieve her discomfort. Justice O’Connor rebuts this
argument by asserting that “[t]he FEPA and the PDA mandate that an employer treat
pregnancy with neutrality, but not preferentially.”106 This premise of law does not
support this argument because Allen was not asking for preferential treatment.
Alternatively, she was asking to be treated the same as all the other non-lactating
employees by not having restrictions placed on the types of bodily functions she was
permitted to attend to during an impromptu break. Allen would have been asking for
a special accommodation if she had been fired because she took an impromptu break
when her employer prohibited impromptu breaks for all of its employees. The
Supreme Court of Ohio misinterpreted Allen’s argument that her lactation needs
should have been accommodated.
IV. IMPACT OF THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO’S DECISION
A. Opening the Door to Lactation Discrimination in Ohio by Permitting Employers
to Rebut a Prima Facie Case of Sex Discrimination with Plaintiff’s Violation of a
Facially Discriminatory Employment Policy
The Supreme Court of Ohio’s reliance on the conclusory analysis at the appellate
court level ignores the fact that lactation is a sex-specific bodily function. The
appellate court dismissed the idea that the impromptu break policy was
discriminatory on its face because Allen “was simply and plainly terminated . . . for
taking an unauthorized, extra break (unlike the restroom breaks which were

105

One way that Totes could have met this burden is by supplying evidence that it
terminated other non-lactating employees for taking impromptu breaks that lasted fifteen
minutes or longer.
106

Allen v. Totes/Isotoner Corp., 915 N.E.2d 622, 631 (Ohio 2009) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
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authorized and available to all of the employees, appellant included).”107 The use of
this “sex-neutral comparability analysis in [lactation], as in pregnancy employment
cases, for example, could potentially allow employers to discriminate based on a
characteristic that only women posses as a pretext for discrimination based on their
sex.”108
For example, if an employer permits employees to take impromptu breaks to tend
to only particular bodily functions, it can be inferred from the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s decision that it would be permissible for an employer to rightfully terminate a
lactating employee for tending to any lactation-related activities during such breaks.
These lactation-related activities could include changing the wet nursing pads in her
bra.109 She could also be terminated for taking a break to change her shirt when it
becomes saturated with breast milk as a result of becoming engorged. As long as the
lactating employee was able to take breaks to urinate and defecate, which are sexneutral and “authorized and available to all of the employees,”110 she can still be
rightfully terminated for tending to any sex-specific bodily functions outside these
stipulated activities under the guise of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason of
insubordination. An example of a facially discriminatory employment policy
outside of the realm of breaks which would be deemed permissible under this sexneutral logic includes a policy where an employer could ban the use of breast pumps
entirely on the employer’s premise because all other employees would also be
banned from using a breast pump on the premises.111 The implications of allowing
an employer to single out lactation-related activities from its employment policies
are inherently discouraging to breastfeeding women who are trying to balance their
careers while providing what they feel is the best nourishment available to their
children.

107

Id. at 627.

108
Brianne Whelan, Comment, For Crying Out Loud: Ohio’s Legal Battle with Public
Breastfeeding and Hope for the Future, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 669, 698
(2005) (citing Martinez v. N.B.C. Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“[f]inding
that ‘tasteless and offensive’ remarks directed towards an employee pumping her breast milk
did not constitute sex discrimination”)).
109

It is recommended that nursing pads be changed as soon as they become damp to avoid
the risk of infection. See Mastitis While Breast-Feeding – Home Treatment, WEBMD,
http://www.webmd.com/parenting/baby/tc/mastitis-while-breast-feeding-home-treatment (last
visited Mar. 9, 2011). It is foreseeable that this could result in a lactating employee needing to
take frequent breaks. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to believe an employer may wish to
terminate an employee that requires more frequent breaks than a non-lactating employee.
110

Totes/Isotoner, 915 N.E.2d at 627 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

111

It is simple to see that this employment policy is facially discriminatory because of sex
as only females have to ability to utilize a breast pump because they are the only sex that is
able to lactate. Therefore, a sex neutral comparison approach toward evaluating employment
policies to see if they are facially discriminatory is entirely inappropriate.
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B. The Supreme Court of Ohio’s Refusal to Clarify Whether Lactation
Discrimination Is a Cognizable Claim Will Cause Conflicts Among the Ohio
Appellate Districts
Totes/Isotoner marks the first time the issue of lactation discrimination has been
raised in Ohio.112 Despite this fact, the Supreme Court of Ohio still elected to avoid
determining whether Allen had established a prima facie case of pregnancy
discrimination.113 As a result, some of Ohio’s appellate districts will likely rely on
unsuitable federal court interpretations of the federal PDA in order to interpret the
Ohio PDA in future instances of lactation discrimination in Ohio. This is precisely
what happened at the trial court level of Totes/Isotoner.
The Totes/Isotoner trial court relied on the Sixth Circuit opinion in Derungs v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.114 The extensive reliance on this federal case was
inappropriate because this case illustrates the issue of discrimination in a public
accommodation context; it does not represent a case of employment
discrimination.115 In Derungs, the Sixth Circuit reviewed the legislative history of
the Ohio PDA and determined that the Ohio General Assembly only intended to
permit pregnancy discrimination claims to extend to those claims arising from issues
in the workplace, not from issues of public accommodation.116 The court came to
this conclusion because the General Assembly amended § 4112.02(A) with the Ohio
PDA, but it failed to amend § 4112.02(G). Thereby, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that
the Ohio Legislature purposely chose to limit the scope of pregnancy discrimination
claims to the workplace context.117 The Sixth Circuit relied strictly on statutory
interpretation when it stated “breastfeeding discrimination does not constitute gender
discrimination” in the public accommodations context.118 The Sixth Circuit was not
112

See Totes/Isotoner, 915 N.E.2d 622.

113

See id. at 623-24.

114

Derungs II, 374 F.3d 428 (6th Cir. 2004).

115

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(G) (West 2008) governs public accommodations while
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(A) (West 2008) governs employment discrimination. It is
unlawful discriminatory practice:
For any proprietor or any employee, keeper, or manager of a place of public
accommodation to deny to any person, except for reasons applicable alike to all
persons regardless of race, color, religion, sex, military status, national origin,
disability, age, or ancestry, the full enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages,
facilities, or privileges of the place of public accommodation.
Id. § 4112.02(G).
116

See Derungs II, 374 F.3d at 436-37; see generally Katherine A. Macfarlane, Comment,
Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores: Another Door Shut—A Federal Interpretation Excluding
Breastfeeding from the Scope of a State’s Sex Discrimination Protection, 38 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 2319, 2320-22 (2005). The issue of lactation discrimination under Ohio law should not
be left to the federal courts to interpret. Derungs is a perfect example of a federal court
overstepping its bounds to decide matters of state law. The question in this case should have
been certified for the Supreme Court of Ohio to decide. Id.
117

Derungs II, 374 F.3d at 437.

118

Totes/Isotoner, 915 N.E.2d at 627 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Derungs II, 374
F.3d at 439).
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stating that breastfeeding discrimination did not apply to the workplace context
because the employment section of the statute had already been amended by the
Ohio PDA to prohibit pregnancy discrimination.119 The Supreme Court of Ohio
should have clarified that lactation discrimination is a form of pregnancy
discrimination in order to prevent Ohio appellate districts from erroneously applying
federal cases such as Derungs.
Similarly, other Ohio appellate districts may choose to reject the flawed Derungs
rationale that “breastfeeding discrimination does not constitute gender
discrimination.”120 The Supreme Court of Ohio never explicitly overruled or
affirmed the Totes/Isotoner trial court’s reliance on this federal court decision.121
Instead, it let “stand the appellate court’s holding that LaNisa Allen was fired for
leaving her post without permission rather than for pumping her breasts . . . leaving
unanswered the question of whether she even asserted a cognizable cause of
action.”122 Some appellate districts may decide to recognize that lactation
discrimination is a cognizable claim if they chose to follow Justice O’Connor’s
concurring opinion. Justice O’Connor stated she “would hold that genderdiscrimination claims arising from lactation are cognizable under Ohio’s FEPA as
amended by the PDA.”123 However, the Supreme Court of Ohio’s refusal to clarify
whether lactation discrimination is a cognizable claim of sex discrimination under
Ohio law encourages inconsistency in the future decisions among Ohio’s appellate
districts because it remains unclear how Ohio’s employment discrimination
legislation should be interpreted on this issue.
C. Recommendation for Ohio Employers
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court of Ohio neglected to recognize a facially
discriminatory employment policy,124 it is advisable that employers should still make
a good faith effort to prevent discrimination against lactating employees in the
workplace. If another lactation discrimination case arises with a plaintiff who
survives the employer’s rebuttal of articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for termination, it appears possible that a majority of the Supreme Court of
Ohio would hold that lactation discrimination is a form of pregnancy discrimination.
Justice O’Connor, the late Chief Justice Moyer, and Justice Pfeifer agreed that sex
discrimination includes lactation discrimination. Consequently, Ohio employers
should not interpret the Totes/Isotoner decision as a carte blanche to deny lactating
employees equal treatment in the workplace.

119

The Derungs decision has since been partially overruled by the Ohio General Assembly
when it enacted Senate Bill 41 (2005) which provides: “A mother is entitled to breast-feed her
baby in any location of a place of public accommodation wherein the mother otherwise is
permitted.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.55 (West 2005).
120

Totes/Isotoner, 915 N.E.2d at 627 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Derungs II, 374
F.3d at 439).
121

See id. at 623-24 (per curiam).

122

Id. at 632 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).

123

Id. at 630 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

124

See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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V. NAVIGATING THE LITIGATION OF A LACTATION DISCRIMINATION CASE IN OHIO
Given the fact that the Supreme Court of Ohio failed to articulate whether
lactation discrimination is included within the scope of the Ohio FEPA, as amended
by the Ohio PDA,125 lactating employee plaintiffs must guess as to what the
appropriate litigation strategy is that they should utilize in future cases. Incidentally,
since the Supreme Court of Ohio did not completely forestall the application of the
Ohio FEPA to lactation discrimination cases,126 this section will explore the key
aspects that should make up a plausible argument for relief to a lactating employee
plaintiff who has been discriminated against in the workplace.
Lactation discrimination in the workplace is an issue of first impression in Ohio.
Consequently, an argument to provide protection against lactation discrimination
must be developed against the relevant federal case law127 that has applied the
federal PDA. It is useful to evaluate the federal case law interpreting the federal
PDA in order to better understand how the Ohio PDA would be applied to similar
contingencies. This methodology is logical because “the Ohio PDA is governed by
the same principles that govern the federal claim of pregnancy discrimination.”128
A. Lactation Is Not Equivalent to Breastfeeding
One federal court has held that the type of discrimination prohibited by Title VII
and the federal PDA needs to be based upon “the gender-specific biological
functions of pregnancy and child-bearing.”129 While federal courts have been
reluctant to classify breastfeeding as a protected status under the federal PDA,130
these courts have not been faced with the argument that there is a significant
distinction between breastfeeding and lactation.
Federal courts have often resorted to dismissing breastfeeding discrimination
claims on the basis that breastfeeding is a choice.131 These federal courts have
determined that breastfeeding is a form of childrearing rather than a biological
function of pregnancy.132 Therefore, it is important to distinguish breastfeeding from
lactation. The argument that lactation and breastfeeding are separate and distinct
was made in the Totes/Isotoner case,133 however, the trial court failed to recognize
125

See Totes/Isotoner, 915 N.E.2d 622 (per curiam).

126

See id.

127

See generally Martinez v. N.B.C. Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Fejes v.
Gilpin Ventures, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1487 (D. Colo. 1997); Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F.
Supp. 867 (W.D. Ky. 1990).
128

Cleveland v. Fed. Express Corp., 83 Fed. App’x 74, 81 n.2 (6th Cir. 2003).

129

Piantanida v. Wyman Ctr., Inc., 116 F.3d 340, 342 (8th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added).
Further, the court held that the PDA does not include “an individual’s choice to care for a
child” because this choice does not constitute “a ‘medical condition’ related to childbirth or
pregnancy.” Id.
130
See generally Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d 305; Fejes, 960 F. Supp. 1487; Wallace, 789 F.
Supp. 867.
131

See, e.g., Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d 305.

132

See id.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol59/iss2/6

18

2011]

WEANING OHIO EMPLOYERS OFF OF LACTATION

283

the legal implications between these two terms. Instead, the trial court incorrectly
relied on Derungs and made the illogical statement that:
Allen gave birth over five months prior to her termination from Totes.
Pregnant [women] who give birth and chose not to breastfeed or pump
their breasts do not continue to lactate for five months. Thus, Allen’s
condition of lactating was not a condition relating to pregnancy but rather
a condition relating to breastfeeding.134
Justice O’Connor noted that she found “that conclusion curious and inaccurate.”135
She stated, “given the physiological aspects of lactation, I have little trouble
concluding that lactation also has a clear, undeniable nexus with pregnancy and with
childbirth.”136 Conversely, breastfeeding is a social behavior, rather than a purely
biological process, defined as feeding a child from a mother’s breast.137 A cause of
action exists in a lactation discrimination case when an employer does not treat a
lactating employee “the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other
persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.”138 In
contrast, a breastfeeding discrimination case would likely be premised on
childrearing discrimination.139
133

Totes/Isotoner trial court, No. CV06-03-0917, slip op. at 6 (Butler Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl.
July 31, 2007), aff’d, 915 N.E.2d 622 (Ohio 2009).
134

Id. at 7.

135

Allen v. Totes/Isotoner Corp., 915 N.E.2d 622, 630 (Ohio 2009) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring). Justice O’Connor continues defining lactation as a biological function:
Lactation—the formation and secretion of milk by the mammary glands—is believed
to be stimulated by prolactin, a hormone. During pregnancy, the level of prolactin in a
woman is inhibited by high levels of estrogen and progesterone. Following delivery,
levels of estrogen and progesterone in the woman fall while the level of prolactin
remains high. Prolactin then stimulates and maintains the production of milk.
Colostrum, a substance that contains more protein and less fat and sugar than breast
milk, is secreted by the breasts during pregnancy and in the days immediately
following childbirth. Milk production begins thereafter, usually on the third or fourth
postpartum day, and breast milk appears.
Id. (citations omitted).
136

Id.

137

See MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/breastfeeding (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
138
Fortier v. U.S. Steel Group, No. 01-2029, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11788, at *8 (W.D.
Pa. June 4, 2002) (omission in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006)). Federal
courts have held that employees with temporary disabilities are “similar in their ability or
inability to work” when compared to pregnant employees. See, e.g., Meyer v. Brown & Root
Constr. Co., 661 F.2d 369, 373 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding the defendant employer failed to treat
pregnant employee plaintiff in the “same manner as other temporarily disabled workers”).
139
For example, an employee may be treated adversely by her employer without fear of
engaging in pregnancy discrimination if she requests additional time off work to breastfeed
her child or if her request to bring her child to work during her breaks to breastfeed on the
employer’s premises is denied. Discrimination on the basis of childrearing or childcare is not
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B. Lactation Discrimination Is Included Within the Scope of Ohio’s Pregnancy
Discrimination Statute
1. A Plain Meaning Approach
Statutory interpretation begins and ends with an analysis of the plain meaning of
the words a legislature has chosen to utilize in the statute.140 A close examination of
the legislative intent and statutory construction of Ohio’s employment discrimination
statutes reveals that lactation discrimination should be included within the scope of
these two statutes. The Ohio FEPA states that it is unlawful:
For any employer, because of the race, color, religion, sex, military status,
national origin, disability, age, or ancestry of any person, to discharge
without just cause, to refuse to hire, or otherwise to discriminate against
that person with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, or any matter directly or indirectly related to employment.141
The Ohio FEPA was subsequently amended by the Ohio PDA, which states that:
[T]he terms “because of sex” and “on the basis of sex” include, but are
not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, any illness arising
out of and occurring during the course of a pregnancy [or] childbirth . . . .
Women affected by pregnancy [or] childbirth . . . shall be treated the
same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so
affected . . . .142
When courts are construing a statute, they “start with the assumption that the
legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words.”143 In this
statute, the language has been broadly constructed. For instance, rather than simply
using the phrase “because of pregnancy” the legislature deliberately chose to use the
more expansive language “because of or on the basis of pregnancy.”144 This trend of
utilizing broad language continues with the language “women affected by pregnancy
[or] childbirth,”145 rather than more constrictive language such as “pregnant women.”
A lactating woman is certainly a “woman affected by pregnancy” because women do

likely to be considered sex discrimination because both men and women can provide childcare
duties. Childcare responsibilities do not have a basis in sex-specific biological differences.
Conversely, lactation does have a basis in sex-specific biological differences because only
females have the capability to lactate.
140

See Kevin Schwin, Note, Toward a Plain Meaning Approach to Analyzing Title VII:
Employment Discrimination Protection Of Transsexuals, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 645, 667
(2009) (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (“[I]t is
ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by
which we are governed.”)).
141

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(A) (West 2008) (emphasis added).

142

Id. § 4112.01(B) (West 2009) (emphasis added).

143

Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962).

144

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(B).

145

Id.
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not spontaneously lactate without first becoming pregnant and experiencing
childbirth. As Justice O’Connor stated in her concurring opinion, “affected” is an
“expansive term[].”146 The term “related” is also “a generous choice of wording,
suggesting that interpretation should favor inclusion rather than exclusion in the
close cases.”147 A lactating woman lactates “because of or on the basis of [her]
pregnancy.” Furthermore, she is a woman “affected by pregnancy [or] childbirth.”
The expansive diction used in this statute supports the logical conclusion that the
Ohio FEPA, as amended by the Ohio PDA, was designed to protect lactating
women.
It is logical to broadly interpret both the Ohio FEPA and the Ohio PDA in order
to include the status of lactation as a protected class within these civil rights statutes.
The Ohio PDA is almost identically worded when compared to its federal
counterpart. Courts have recognized that the federal PDA is a remedial statute that
should be liberally construed.148 As such, the Ohio PDA should also be liberally
construed. The Ohio State Legislature and the Ohio Supreme Court have maintained
that the Ohio civil rights statutes should be liberally construed.149 Many federal
courts have also stated that the federal civil rights counterpart Title VII, which the
Ohio civil rights statutes are based on, “is a remedial statute which should be
liberally construed.”150 The tendency to broadly interpret civil rights statutes
supports the argument that lactation discrimination fits into the broad definitions of
sex discrimination under FEPA and, consequently, pregnancy discrimination under
the Ohio PDA.
The Ohio PDA contains language that expressly states that protection is provided
to the categories of pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions.151
Additionally, the statutory language signals the reader to interpret that these three
categories of protected-status that are not meant to be an exhaustive list. Both the
federal and Ohio PDAs contain a “not limited to” clause placed directly before these

146

Allen v. Totes/Isotoner Corp., 915 N.E.2d 622, 629 (Ohio 2009) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring). Justice O’Connor further defines “affected” as “[having] produce[d] a material
influence upon.” Id. (alteration in original) (citing MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 19 (10th ed. 1993)).
147

Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1402 (N.D. Ill. 1994).

148

See, e.g., Williams v. Macfrugal’s Bargains-Close-Outs, Inc., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 98, 100
(Ct. App. 1998) (“There is no question but that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) (42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k)) is a remedial statute and should be liberally construed.”).
149
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.08 (West 2008); Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Lysyj,
313 N.E.2d 3, 6 (Ohio 1974) (“R.C. 4112.02(G) and 4112.01(I) are remedial statutes and are
unbounded by the rules of strict construction that governed R.C. 2901.35. When determining
the scope of the “public accommodations” amendments to Chapter 4112, the commission,
initially, and the courts, upon review, are to construe those statutes liberally in order to
effectuate the legislative purpose and fundamental policy implicit in their enactment, and to
assure that the rights granted by the statutes are not defeated by overly restrictive
interpretation.” (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.11)).
150

Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir. 2007).

151

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(B) (West 2009).
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three categories.152 If the Ohio Legislature intended to limit the coverage of the Ohio
PDA to only pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions, an argument can
be made that the Ohio Legislature would have refrained from including the federal
“not limited to” language in the state statute.153 Thus far, the “not limited to” clauses
of either versions of the PDA have yet to be interpreted by a federal or Ohio court.154
A plain reading of the Ohio PDA reveals its expansive statutory language and
supports the conclusion that the Ohio Legislature intended that the statutory
language be interpreted broadly to cover biological processes such as lactation,
which is highly related to pregnancy.
2. The Legislative History and Intent
The Sixth Circuit noted that the Ohio legislature integrated the federal “PDA’s
language almost verbatim into the definitional provisions of § 4112.”155 Therefore,
the federal legislative intent and history can be extrapolated to provide insight into
the intent behind the Ohio PDA.156 As Justice O’Connor noted in her concurring
opinion, the Ohio court in Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co. looked to the congressional
record in order to understand the legislative intent of the federal PDA.157 Since the
Ohio PDA was passed two years after the federal PDA, it can be assumed that the
Ohio Legislature was aware of the corresponding federal legislative history. If the
Ohio Legislature disapproved of this legislative history, it could have overridden the
federal legislative intent with its own state level legislative history. The argument
that the Ohio civil rights statutes were devised to include protection for lactating
employees is supported by Title VII’s overarching policy objective of eliminating
barriers to equal opportunities for all employees in the workplace.158

152
Id. (defining the terms “because of sex” and “on the basis of sex” while stating that
these terms “include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, . . .
childbirth, or related medical conditions”).
153
See Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, Litigating Against Employment Penalties for
Pregnancy, Breastfeeding and Childcare, 44 VILL. L. REV. 355, 377 (1999) (arguing that
federal courts have concluded that breastfeeding is not “pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions [to pregnancy]” and ignored the “plain language” of the federal PDA,
which expressly states that discrimination should not be limited to these factors).
154

See id. (asserting that no federal court has interpreted the “not limited to” clause of the
federal PDA).
155

Derungs II, 374 F.3d 428, 436 (6th Cir. 2004).

156

“The amended statutory framework now embodied in Ohio’s FEPA developed similarly
to its federal counterpart . . . the federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.” Allen v.
Totes/Isotoner Corp., 915 N.E.2d. 622, 628 (Ohio 2009) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
157

Id. at 628 (citing Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1402 (N.D. Ill.
1994)). “The essential command of the PDA is that an employer must maintain the same
neutrality towards an employee’s pregnancy as it would . . . [any] other protected-class
status.” Id.
158

See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (“The objective of
Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of the statute. It was to
achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the
past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees.”).
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Lactation is defined as the “[p]eriod following birth during which milk is secreted
in the breasts.”159 The congressional record mentions that “‘the PDA gives a woman
the right . . . to be financially and legally protected before, during and after her
pregnancy.’”160 Even federal courts that have been hostile toward the idea of
extending Title VII protection to breastfeeding discrimination claims have conceded
that the federal PDA “does not require plaintiff to be pregnant when the alleged
discrimination occurs.”161 The legislative intent indicates that physiological and
biological aftereffects of pregnancy, such as lactation, were legislatively intended to
be protected under the PDA.
The Congressional record expressly excluded the federal PDA from a few
applications that are highly related to pregnancy. For example, the Congressional
Record addressed the fear that plaintiffs would attempt to use the federal PDA to
force employers to pay for abortions. Congress prevented this application of the
statute by stating on the record that the federal PDA expressly limits its application
to this contingency.162 When the Ohio Legislature adopted its version of the PDA it
could have followed Congress’s example by expressly excluding the statute’s
application to contingencies involving breastfeeding or lactation discrimination. The
Ohio Legislature did not expressly exclude these potentially protected categories.
Therefore, the legislative history and intent support the inclusion of lactation
discrimination as a cognizable claim that can be brought under the Ohio PDA.
The timeline of the enactment of the federal PDA and the subsequent enactment
of the Ohio PDA combined with its implication on the Ohio legislative intent must
be clearly explained. The Derungs court misinterpreted this legislative history when
it analyzed the impact that the federal PDA had on the Ohio PDA’s legislative intent.
The Sixth Circuit stated:
[W]hen the Ohio Legislature amended the “because of sex” and “on the
basis of sex” definition, Gilbert had not been expressly overruled by the
Supreme Court. Newport News came three years later. . . .

159
See Medical Dictionary, WEBMD (emphasis added), http://dictionary.webmd.com/
terms/lactation (last visited Jan. 4, 2010). Lactation is also defined by in terms of its
biological description as the “[p]roduction of milk.” Id.
160
See Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 153, at 370 n.94 (omission in original) (emphasis
added) (quoting 124 CONG. REC. 38574 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Sarasin)).
161
Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1487, 1493 (D. Colo. 1997). The plaintiff
can still be a member of a protected class even though she was not pregnant at the time of the
adverse employment action. Id. at 1492-93. The Fejes court stated:

The statute does not specify whether the discrimination must occur during the
pregnancy. However, to read Title VII so narrowly would lead to absurd results such
as “prohibit[ing] an employer from firing a woman during her pregnancy but
permit[ing] the employer to terminate her the day after delivery if the reason for
termination was that the woman became pregnant in the first place.”
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Donaldson v. Am. Banco Corp., 945 F. Supp. 1456, 146364 (D. Colo. 1996)).
162

H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 7 (1978).
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Having incorporated the PDA’s language almost verbatim into the
definitional provisions of § 4112, it is clear to us that the Ohio Legislature
was aware of the meaning and rationale of Gilbert, as well as being aware
of the [federal] PDA. The Legislature made a conscious choice to extend
the definition of discrimination to include pregnancy even though there
cannot be a class of similarly situated males. In making this choice,
however, the Legislature extended the definition of discrimination in the
employment context only.163
The reasoning behind the Sixth Circuit’s legislative timeline is incorrect because
Congress, not the Supreme Court, initially rejected the Gilbert analysis when it
enacted the federal PDA. In fact, the Court in Newport News explained that
Congress, in enacting the PDA, both rejected the Gilbert result and endorsed the
reasoning and interpretation of the dissenting opinions.164 The Ohio legislature did
not need to wait for the Supreme Court’s Newport News decision to understand that
the Gilbert analysis had already been rejected by the passage of the federal PDA. At
the time of Ohio PDA’s enactment, the Ohio Legislature intended for the Ohio PDA
to reflect its analogous rejection of the Gilbert analysis at the state level.165
Therefore, applying a Gilbert analysis to a case involving the Ohio PDA is improper
and goes against the Ohio Legislature’s legislative intent.
After the Derungs decision, the Ohio Legislature apparently did not feel it was
necessary to amend the PDA to expressly include lactation or breastfeeding as a
protected class because the Sixth Circuit’s decision indicated that the employment
sections of Ohio’s civil rights statutes were amended by the PDA.166 Consequently,
the Ohio Legislature deemed that the Ohio civil rights statutes already protected
breastfeeding women in an employment context, but concluded that a legislative
amendment was necessary to protect women who breastfeed in places of public
accommodation. The Ohio legislature partially overruled the Derungs court when it
amended Ohio’s building code legislation to protect breastfeeding mothers from
discrimination in a public accommodation context.167 It is inappropriate for an Ohio
court to apply the Gilbert analysis or the analysis from Derungs to a lactation
discrimination case because the reasoning behind both cases has been rejected by the
Ohio legislature.
C. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
The best way to ensure all lactating employees are protected in the workplace is
through additional federal legislation. As recently as 2009, there was pending
163

Derungs II, 374 F.3d 428, 436 (6th Cir. 2004) (footnotes omitted).

164

Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 676-77 (1983)
(noting that Congress enacted the PDA in order to explicitly reject the majority analysis of the
Court in Gilbert); MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 3:12, at 113 (1994).
165
Totes/Isotoner, 915 N.E.2d at 629 (O’Connor, J., concurring). “In rendering their
decisions [in the Derungs I and II cases], the federal courts applied the Gilbert analysis that
has been rejected expressly by both Congress and the Ohio Legislature.” Id. (citing Derungs
I, 141 F. Supp. 2d 884, 889-92 (S.D. Ohio 2000), aff’d, 374 F.3d 428 (6th Cir. 2004)).
166

Derungs II, 374 F.3d at 436-37.

167

See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.55 (West 2005).
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federal legislation to amend Title VII in the form of H.R. Res. 2819, 111th Cong.
(2009). This legislation would have amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by
inserting the words “including lactation” after “childbirth.”168 It also would have
defined lactation as “a condition that may result in the feeding of a child directly
from the breast or the expressing of milk from the breast.”169 Since this proposed
federal legislation continues to fail, Ohio’s General Assembly could adopt
legislation similar to one of the twenty-four states170 that have enacted laws to
provide protection to breastfeeding mothers in the workplace. For instance, Vermont
requires employers to provide reasonable time throughout the day for nursing
mothers to express breast milk for three years after the birth of a child.171 It also
requires employers to make a reasonable accommodation to provide an appropriate
private space that is not a bathroom stall, and prohibits discrimination against an
employee who exercises rights provided under this act.172
The recent passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act173 included
new federal protections for lactating employees. This new legislation amends the
Fair Labor Standards Act to require reasonable unpaid breaks for nursing
employees.174 This legislation fails to protect all lactating employees. For example,
employers with fewer than fifty employees are not subject to these requirements if
they can demonstrate that they would cause an undue hardship on the employer.175
Furthermore, since this legislation amends the FLSA instead of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, the legislation fails to protect employees from lactation discrimination
itself. Therefore, the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Totes/ Isotoner stands as the
relevant law in Ohio, and lactating employees remain uncertain about whether they
are protected from lactation discrimination. Although an employer is now required
to accommodate a lactating employee, without explicit protection from lactation
discrimination, this employer is free to refuse to hire lactating employees altogether
or engage in adverse employment practices toward lactating employees.176
168

H.R. Res. 2819, 111th Cong. (2009).

169

Id.

170

The states that have laws related to breastfeeding in the workplace are: Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. This is in addition
to the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. See Breastfeeding Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGS. (Sept. 2010), http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/Health/BreastfeedingLaws/tabid/
14389/Default.aspx.
171

VT. STAT. ANN tit. 21, § 305 (2008).

172

Id. § 305(a), (c).

173

29 U.S.C. § 207 (2006).

174

The amendment to the FLSA provides that employers must furnish a private location,
other than a restroom, which may be used by the employee to express breast milk. Id. §
207(r)(1).
175

Id. § 207(r)(3).

176

These adverse employment actions could include demoting, refusing to promote,
refusing to give pay raises to lactating employees only.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision to affirm the summary judgment in favor
of Totes opened the door for employers to implement facially discriminatory
employment policies that single out lactating women. Because the court did not
decide whether discrimination on the basis of lactation is prohibited by Ohio’s
FEPA, as amended by the Ohio PDA, Ohio’s courts of appeals will likely conflict
over this issue in the future. The Supreme Court of Ohio should establish that
discrimination on the basis of lactation is considered pregnancy discrimination under
Ohio law as “lactation is ‘because of or on the basis of pregnancy’ and that women
who are lactating are women ‘affected by pregnancy [or] childbirth.’”177

177

Allen v. Totes/Isotoner Corp., 915 N.E.2d 622, 630 (Ohio 2009) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (alteration in original).
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